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Abstract 
 
Gibrat's Law states that the growth of towns and cities is independent of their initial size. We show that the 
Industrial Revolution was revolutionary enough to violate this law for 1761-1801, 1801-1891, and all decades 
within. Small places grew more slowly throughout this period. Larger towns, in contrast, typically grew faster, 
but only if they were in core Industrial Revolution Counties. In line with economic theory, towns grew 
disproportionately when agglomeration economies exceeded urban disamenities, allowing wage rises that 
induced workers to migrate to the town. This only occurred in places characterised by new, mechanised 
industries and mining. 
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Introduction 
The historiography of the English Industrial Revolution has undergone something of a 
revolution itself in the last thirty years or so. The initial picture was one of revolution, 
economically, socially and politically. In this characterisation the old order, based on land, 
was swept away and replaced by a new order, based on steam, mines, factories and railways. 
That shift was accompanied by social and political change, with inventors and entrepreneurs 
becoming rich enough to challenge the landed gentry, while the urban masses – and fear of 
the urban masses – became impossible to ignore. The last thirty years have seen a sustained 
and successful challenge to the idea that the Industrial Revolution was revolutionary. Rates of 
economic growth are now seen as much slower than had hitherto been claimed, and the 
geographic extent of the Industrial Revolution is more limited.  
Yet for all the validity of the challenge, there is no denying the massive and unprecedented 
rise in population. The population of England grew from 1761 onwards, rising from 6.1m in 
1761 to 8.7m in 1801, 16.7m in 1851 and 27.1m by 1891 (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981, p. 
529 & Census for relevant years). This article looks at whether that rise should be seen as 
disruptive and “revolutionary” or whether it should be seen as something steadier, and more 
predictable. 
To do this, this article looks specifically at whether Gibrat’s Law is violated. Gibrat's Law 
states that the growth of cities is independent of their initial size. If it holds, then population 
growth across places is reasonably even, at least in the sense that initial size cannot predict 
the likely growth rate of a place. If it is violated, we will see some places shoot ahead, and 
some left behind, according to their initial sizes. If so, that would help historians understand 
how England successfully came to accommodate a population that grew so rapidly, without 
resorting to mass-emigration, or succumbing to hunger and even starvation. 
*Manuscript
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Empirical support for Gibrat's Law is mixed, with studies finding it more likely to hold for 
larger towns and/or over longer periods. This article formally tests the hypothesis that the 
quadrupling of the English population, in a period characterised by huge shifts in the 
economic structure, would be sufficient to violate Gibrat’s Law. The obverse is by no means 
a straw man: the Industrial Revolution was not, by modern standards, a period of rapid 
economic development.  
We find that this hypothesis clearly and unambiguously holds: Gibrat's Law was violated 
between 1761 and 1891. This is true for all individual decades, and for all longer periods. It is 
true for England as a whole, for counties central to the Industrial Revolution, and for those 
that it largely bypassed. In each case, the relationship between initial size and growth is U 
shaped, with low growth for places of a small to medium size consistently statistically 
significantly below average growth rates. In addition, larger places in Industrial Revolution 
counties generally grew statistically more quickly than is compatible with Gibrat's Law. In 
short, the combination of massive population growth and the Industrial Revolution was 
sufficient to cause repeated, extensive, violations of Gibrat's Law.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: the second section sets out the basics of population 
growth in this era, the third section discusses relevant literature relating to Gibrat’s Law, the 
fourth section describes the data, section five looks at whether Gibrat’s Law holds, while 
section six places this finding in context. Section seven concludes. 
Population in the era of the Industrial Revolution  
The single most important fact is that England contained 21m more people in 1891 than in 
1761 – its population had grown more than four-fold. These people could not be 
accommodated on new land, for even in 1761 England was a nation wholly under cultivation. 
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Unlike the United States in this era, there was no extensive margin, no prairies or plains 
waiting to be settled. Nor could they remain on existing land: England could not support 27m 
people given the agricultural production frontier in this era. The only alternatives to 
urbanisation and industrialisation were starvation or emigration.  
As a result, England became an urban nation, based on industry and trade. The discovery of 
extensive coal deposits made this feasible. Coal powered the factories that produced the 
goods, and the trains and ships that exported them around the world – and brought back the 
grain and other foodstuffs needed to feed the nation’s ever larger population. Towns and 
cities grew, often dramatically.  
This matters not only to economic historians, but to political and social historians as well. 
Towns were and are different to the countryside. Social bonds are different, and politics are 
different as well. Cities are places of social change, upheaval and sometimes revolution. The 
Peterloo Massacre, the 1842 General Strike and the Chartist movement were very much 
urban phenomena. The 1832 Great Reform Act enfranchised towns and cities, changing the 
relationship between land and parliament forever. It is notable that the Corn Laws – which 
kept out foreign wheat to the benefit of landowners – were passed prior to the Great Reform 
Act, and repealed after it. The franchise mattered, and urban voters had very different 
priorities to those who lived in the countryside. For these reasons, political historians care 
about urban growth, and, by extension, about whether Gibrat’s Law holds. 
English towns did not grow equally quickly. The new industries were based on coal. Coal is 
heavy and so expensive to move. As a result places near to coalfields often became major 
centres not just of mining, but also of industry. The nineteenth century also witnessed a 
transport revolution, in which steam trains and steamships lowered the costs of moving goods 
around England and the world. This in turn allowed industry to be geographically 
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concentrated. Free-trade policies and international peace supported these trends. This led to a 
concentration of production across nations, increasing England’s share of total manufacturing 
output (Crafts and Leunig, 2005). The biggest exception to the pattern of free trade was of 
course the US, but even here free trade within the US led to manufacturing becoming 
concentrated in the Northern manufacturing belt (Klein and Crafts, 2012). 
Trains also allowed food to be brought into cities from much further away, much more 
cheaply, eliminating one constraint on city size. Steamships did the same for international 
foodstuffs, to the particular benefit of coastal towns. The decline in domestic (i.e. household) 
production of goods such as clothing or furniture offered greatest advantage to those who 
lived in towns, given that they had better access to shops. Finally, the arrival of the railway 
meant that people were able to migrate from one part of the country much more easily than 
they could have done before, and for the first time in human history opened up the prospect 
of regular contact with family left behind. Taken as a whole, the English migrated rather than 
commuted (O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999, 2004). This was understandable given the costs 
of commuting relative to wages, particularly in the pre-railway era (Cameron and 
Muellbauer, 1998). 
Taken as a whole the importance of coal, railways, trade and so on meant that we can 
imagine a wide range of outcomes. This is particularly true in an era with no planning 
controls, and next to no zoning rules. It is possible that towns that were already large would 
grow dramatically, while villages remained as villages. This would be a clear violation of 
Gibrat’s Law. Alternatively, growth could happen in ways that were predictable by (say) the 
location of previously unimportant coal deposits, but which would offer no relationship with 
prior population. That would be compatible with Gibrat’s Law.  
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There was certainly much heterogeneity in population growth at the level of the individual 
place. While population as a whole tripled between 1801 and 1891, this was not true for all 
places. For example, Bath, the thirteenth largest town in England in 1801, grew by only 50% 
in these ninety years. Even more extreme is the cathedral city of Salisbury in Wiltshire, 
which grew by just 6% in total in 90 years, or one additional family a year. Some cities, such 
as Oxford and Cambridge, grew in line with the national average. The textile towns, such as 
Oldham and Preston, and trading cities such as Liverpool and Manchester, grew seven-fold or 
more, transforming the previous agricultural backwater of Lancashire into one of the most 
populous and urban counties of England. There were even more dramatic rises elsewhere, 
particularly in new mining communities. For example, the iron mining town of Dalton-on-
Furness grew 32-fold. Even more spectacularly, the discovery of coal in Seaham transformed 
a sleepy coastal village of 144 people on a “dreary coast” (Byron, 1830, p. 258) into a major 
colliery and port town of almost 14,000 people. The railway also had significant effects. 
Swindon grew 20-fold, and Crewe almost 50-fold, both having 33,000 people by the end of 
this period. The indirect effects of the railways were large as well: the seaside resorts of 
Brighton and Torquay grew 16-fold.  
In short, England in 1891 looked different to England in 1801. There were far more people, 
and they were in different places. The population was more urban, and more northern. 
England’s rates of population growth were far higher than those experienced in other 
European countries, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century (Alter and Clark, p. 
53). This in turn led to internationally unprecedented rates of urbanisation. As early as 1840 
around half the English population was to be found in urban areas, sixty years before the 
same could be said for France, Germany or the United States (Crafts, 1985, pp. 57-59, Atack 
and Passell, 1994 p. 239).  
6 
 
These towns and cities were growing in an era before many of the things that make city living 
easy had been invented. Nineteenth century English towns and cities were heated with smoky 
coal, leading to awful air quality. Streets were filled with manure-producing horse-drawn 
carts and buses. Sewerage and refuse removal systems were at best erratic and sometimes 
non-existent, especially earlier in the period. Slums were common, fresh food was not. 
Conditions were improving – brick built houses and paved roads were common by mid-
century. Urban centres in the industrial revolution were described as “not so much towns as 
barracks: not the refuge of a civilisation, but the barracks of an industry” (Hammond and 
Hammond, 1917, 39). Despite this, many of those with strong positions in the labour market 
chose to migrate to cities, demonstrating via revealed preference that they perceived that 
higher wages compensated for the problems of urban life (Hammond and Hammond, 1917; 
Humphries and Leunig, 2009). Towns and cities had both advantages and disadvantages – 
something that we shall return to later. Gibrat’s Law is important in this context: if large 
cities are simply unbearable to live in, then the largest cities will grow much more slowly, 
and Gibrat’s Law will be violated.  
Literature survey 
Gibrat first put forward his “law” in his 1931 book, Les Inégalités économiques. It states that 
growth rates are independent of initial size, and can be applied to either places or firms. 
Surveys can be found in Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) for places and Sutton (1997) for firms. 
Some studies confirm Gibrat’s Law, and some do not. Most look at the United States. 
Ioannides and Overman (2003), Eeckhout (2004), and Gonzáles-Val (2010) find that Gibrat’s 
Law broadly holds, while Black and Henderson (2003), Garmestani et al. (2007), Glaeser et 
al. (2011), and Michaels et al. (2012) find departures from it. Some common results stand 
out. Gibrat’s Law appears more likely to hold in the long run, and for larger places. Thus 
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Gonzáles-Val (2010) and Glaeser et al. (2011) point out that even though Gibrat’s Law seems 
to hold in the long-run – such as the period 1900-2000 in the former and 1790-1990 in the 
latter – there are decades when that is not so. Michaels et al. (2012) find that Gibrat’s Law is 
violated for intermediate-size places, while Eeckhout (2004) and Garmestani et al. (2007) 
suggest that Gibrat’s Law is less likely to hold for small places. Studies examining other 
countries also find mixed results, with good evidence that smaller places are more likely to 
violate Gibrat’s Law. Examples include Guerin-Paca (1995) for France, Eaton and Eckstein 
(1997) for France and Japan, Soo (2007) for Malaysia, and Bosker et al. (2008) for West 
Germany.  
The literature also finds that economic shocks can lead to the violation of Gibrat’s 
Law. Bosker et al. (2008), for example, examine the effect of the Second World War on the 
growth of German cities. They find that Gibrat’s Law holds before but not after the war, 
suggesting that the disruption caused by the war and its aftermath had a substantial impact on 
West Germany’s urban system.  The literature also covers long run shocks such as the 
movement from an agrarian to an industrial economy (Glaeser et al., 2011, Michaels et al 
2012), or the later movement from an industrial to a service based economy (Black and 
Henderson, 2003). This literature again suggests that Gibrat’s Law can be violated in these 
circumstances.  This paper is related most closely to this body of literature. 
 
Data Description 
Great Britain undertook the first census in 1801, and has had decennial censuses ever since. 
From 1811 onwards the census reports the population in a place both at the census date, and 
as per the previous census. It is thus straightforward to make decade on decade comparisons. 
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It is not straightforward, in contrast, to make comparisons over a longer period, because the 
definitions of places change from one census to the next. At various times in the nineteenth 
century, for example, England had “Ancient Counties”, “Administrative Counties” and 
“Registration Counties”. We are, however, extremely fortunate that Wrigley and co-authors 
have done the detailed work to produce consistent place level population time series from 
1801-1891, and we are extremely grateful to them for allowing us to use their data.1 We 
aggregated their generally parish level data into recognisable towns, for example by merging 
the separate parishes that make up cities such as Norwich, or London.  
The period prior to 1801 is more problematic. There were no censuses for these years, and we 
have instead to rely on population data at the level of the “hundred” (Wrigley, 2011, table 
A2.7). This was an administrative unit, dating back to Saxon times, larger than a parish, and 
smaller than a county. In an agrarian era it would usually include clusters of villages, or a 
small town and its surrounding villages. Thus, for example, the county of Cornwall contains 
12 hundreds, while the 1801 census records that it has 205 separate places, mostly small 
villages. A Cornwall hundred therefore contains an average of 17 separate places, typical for 
hundreds across England. We aggregate the hundreds that made up London, Leeds, Liverpool 
and Manchester; although for simplicity we continue to refer to hundreds throughout. We 
need to be careful in interpreting the pre-1801 results, therefore, since hundreds agglomerate 
places of different sizes within a single unit. The hundreds remain constant over the period 
1761-1801, allowing us to perform the analysis for the period as a whole, as well as for 
individual decades. We cannot, however, join the pre- and post- 1801 periods, as the data 
sources are just too different.  
                                                            
1
 E.A. Wrigley, G.H. Newton, A.E.M. Satchell, and L Shaw-Taylor, 1801 to 1891 Census Report of England and 
Wales: Parish and Registration District Population dataset (2009), funded by ESRC grants RES 000-23-0131 and 
RES-000-23-1579. Details of the methodology used are given in Wrigley (2011).  
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The descriptive statistics are as follows. There are 598 places for which we have data for the 
period 1761-1801. 511 grew over this period, 87 did not. The 87 are generally smaller, and 
contain 10.8% of the total initial population. The unweighted average growth rate is 0.65% 
per year, the median 0.41%, and the standard deviation 0.007. The distribution of growth 
rates is given graphically in appendix one. The top quarter of hundreds by initial size grew by 
0.64%, the smallest quarter by 0.72%, while those in between grew by 0.41%. The largest 
proportionate gain was the smallest hundred, Newcastle-under-Lyme, in the Staffordshire 
Potteries District, while the largest gain in absolute terms was London, which grew by 
442,442 people.  
There are 10,672 places in our data set for the period 1801-1891. The mean place contained 
809 people in 1801 and 2,535 in 1891. 7,569 places grew, 3,103 did not. Again, the places 
that did not grow were typically smaller at the start of the period: they accounted for 29% of 
the places and 13% of the initial population. The (unweighted) average growth rate was 
0.37% per year, the median was 0.23% and the standard deviation of 0.007. The distribution 
of growth rates is again given graphically in appendix one. Larger places grew notably faster 
than smaller places. The largest quarter of places (with an initial population of 611 people or 
more) grew at 0.63% per year, while the smallest quarter grew at 0.26% per year, and those 
in between by 0.29%. The fastest growth rate was in Middlesbrough, which grew from 352 
people in 1802 to 75,107 in 1891, an annual growth rate of 6.1%. The largest absolute gain 
was again London, which grew from 1m to 5m people in this period, followed by 
Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds and Sheffield, which grew by between a quarter 
and three-quarters of a million people. 
City Growth 
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We now investigate Gibrat’s Law using non-parametric regression analysis. We use the 
methodology pioneered by Ioannides and Overman (2003), and used since by Eeckhout 
(2004) and Gonzáles-Val (2010). The regression equation has the following specification: 
gi = m(Si) + εi          (1) 
where gi is the standardized growth rate of place i (defined as (Pit/Pit-1 – PEt/PEt-1)/ σ(Pit/Pit-1), 
where P indicates population, i a specific place, E England as a whole, t the end date, t-1 the 
prior date, and σ the weighted standard deviation for all places), Si is the log of the population 
of place i at the start of the period and m is a functional relationship. We use relative size as a 
robustness check: the results stand. We do not assume any specific relationship between gi 
and Si. Instead, we use the local average around S smoothed with a symmetrical, continuous 
and weighted kernel. We follow Ioannides and Overman (2003) and use the Nadaraya-
Watson method in which 
 
	∑ KhsSi
n
i1 gi
	∑ KhsSi
n
i1
																																																																																																											(2) 
where Kh is the Epachenikov kernel. The bandwidth h was calculated using the Silverman 
(1986) rule. We again follow Ioannides and Overman (2003) and use 99-percent confidence 
intervals, calculated using the lpoly command in Stata 13. Using 95 or 90 confidence 
intervals does not change the results materially.  
Gibrat’s Law states that growth is independent of initial size. Since the growth rates are 
normalized, Gibrat’s Law can be said to hold if the estimated kernel is not statistically 
different from zero. Conversely, if the estimated kernel is statistically different to zero, we 
can say that Gibrat’s Law does not hold.  
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The long run is much more important than the short run, and for that reason we first present 
our two long run findings, for 1760-1801 and 1801-1891. In each case the population is 
divided into 100 size categories, each equal in log size. There is no reason to expect that all 
size categories will have towns within them: in particular, London is much bigger than 
Manchester, so there will be a range of size categories between Manchester and London that 
have no observations.  
There are four logical possibilities for each size class. If the upper confidence interval is 
below zero, Gibrat's Law is violated because places are growing too slowly. If the upper 
confidence interval is above zero, and the lower confidence interval below zero, Gibrat's Law 
is not violated. If the lower confidence interval is above zero, Gibrat's Law is violated 
because growth is too rapid. Finally, there will be some size classes that have too few 
observations to allow confidence intervals to be assessed. London falls into this category, for 
example. 
The results are given in figures 1 and 2. These and all subsequent figures, give the line of best 
fit and the 1% confidence intervals. The figures all use a common scale for the Y axis, but the 
X axis scale varies according to the relevant maximum population. Because there is only one 
place the size of London, and because it is much larger than other places, there is never an 
estimate for London. For that reason the right hand side of the graph is frequently blank.  
The results are clear: Gibrat’s Law is violated. In both cases there is a U shape relationship 
between initial population and growth. The relationship is more pronounced for the earlier 
period. In this period Gibrat's Law is violated in both directions, with substantial size classes 
that grow at rates incompatible with Gibrat's Law. The principal violations occur for 
hundreds containing 3,600-18,300, and more than 75,000 people. Since there were typically 
17 places per hundred, this implies that Gibrat’s Law was violated for places with 
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populations of around 200-1,100, or above 4,400 people. Far more people lived in the former 
category: the size classes that grew too slowly contained 53% of the population, while the 
size classes that grow too quickly contain only 5%. Of the remainder, 32% live in places of a 
size that does not violate Gibrat's Law, while the remaining 10% live in places for which we 
are unable to provide an estimate.  
For the post 1801 period the violations overwhelmingly consist of medium sized places that 
grow too slowly. There are no substantial size categories that grow too quickly. Gibrat’s Law 
is violated for places with 50-1,600 people, with smaller violations before, and small non-
violations within that range. To modern eyes, places with 1,600 people or fewer are villages, 
of little economic importance. This was not true for 1801. 42% of people lived in places in 
the size categories that grew so slowly as to violate Gibrat’s Law, while a further 3% lived in 
places that grew so fast that they violated Gibrat’s Law. A further 34% lived in places for 
which Gibrat's Law was not violated. The remaining 21% lived in places for which no 
estimate is possible, principally London.  
These two periods present a similar picture. Above all, Gibrat’s Law is unambiguously and 
extensively violated. Around a half of the population lived in places of sizes that violate 
Gibrat’s Law, a third in places of sizes than conform, and the remainder in places for which 
no assessment is possible. The largest violations consist of growth that is too slow: small and 
medium sized places that are bypassed by the overall trends. For sure, some initially small 
places like Crewe and Swindon grew spectacularly, but taken as a whole small to medium 
sized places grew less quickly than the nation as a whole. They were outpaced by both the 
tiny and the large. In contrast, fewer size classes grew so quickly as to violate Gibrat’s Law.  
We can go further, in three dimensions. First, for the period after 1801 we can test Gibrat’s 
Law for counties most and least affected by the Industrial Revolution. (Sample sizes preclude 
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doing this for the earlier period). Second, we can look at the pre- and post-railway parts of the 
nineteenth century. Third, we can look at individual decades, to see whether short term events 
were more likely to cause more extensive violations, or whether there were decades in which 
urban development was more even.  
We follow Crafts in dividing England into “Industrial Revolution” and “non-Industrial 
Revolution” counties, according to the share of employment in modern industrial sectors 
(Crafts 1985, Table 1.1, pp. 4-5). Industrial Revolution counties are those with 29.6% or 
more of the male workforce in modern industries, while non-Industrial Revolution counties 
are those with 14% or fewer in these industries.2 We exclude the nine counties (and London) 
that lie between these figures as they do not fit well into either group. In total, the Industrial 
Revolution counties contain 21% of the population in 1801, 25% in 1841, and 29% in 1891. 
Conversely, the non-Industrial Revolution counties contain 52% of the population in 1801, 
45% in 1841, and 38% in 1891. We can see immediately that, as expected, growth rates were 
typically faster in Industrial Revolution counties than in non-Industrial Revolution counties. 
Figures 3 and 4 give the results for industrial and non-Industrial Revolution counties 
respectively.  
Again, we see that Gibrat’s Law is violated in both cases. For the Industrial Revolution 
counties, the violation broadly covers places with sizes from around 45-300. For non-
Industrial Revolution counties, the violation is much larger, covering places in the range 25-
3,300. The proportion of the population contained in these ranges is strikingly different. Just 
fewer than 10% of people in Industrial Revolution counties lived in places of a size that 
violated Gibrat's Law. The equivalent figure for non-Industrial Revolution counties is 70%. 
                                                            
2
 29.6% is obvious by inspection: there are no counties with between 22% and 29.6%, creating a natural break. 
14% is less obvious and we used the extensive historiography of English counties in making this decision.  
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Furthermore, the confidence intervals are much tighter for the non-Industrial Revolution 
counties: this is partly because the sample size is larger, (see table 1, below), but partly 
reflects the consistency of experience of these places. The knowledge that a place was of 
small to medium size, and located in a non-Industrial Revolution county is a very strong 
predictor that its population will grow markedly more slowly than that of the nation as a 
whole. 
We now turn to look at the pre- and post-railway eras, defined as 1801-1841 and 1841-1891. 
The results are summarised in Table 1, and given graphically in (online) appendix 2.  
Table 1 about here 
Gibrat’s Law is violated in both periods, for the country as a whole, and for both sub-
sections. Some notable patterns emerge. First, the U shaped pattern is again apparent. Second, 
the proportion of the population living in places of sizes that violate Gibrat's Law falls from 
50% prior to the invention of the railway to 33% afterwards. Third, this change is driven 
overwhelmingly by a change in the Industrial Revolution counties. In the earlier period a 
quarter of them grow too slowly, and half grow too quickly. These proportions fall to a sixth 
and a third respectively in the later period. This change in turn is driven primarily by a shift 
in the distribution of the population across places of different sizes, rather than a shift in the 
range of places that violate Gibrat's Law. Fourth, there is little difference in the experience of 
non-Industrial Revolution counties across the two periods, where the vast majority of people 
remain in places that grow too slowly to comply with Gibrat's Law. It is notable, however, 
that the size range of places in non-Industrial Revolution counties that violate Gibrat’s Law 
grows. Relatively large places (4,000-10,000) that had previously been big enough to avoid 
falling behind were now growing significantly more slowly than the nation as a whole.  
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We now turn to look at the individual decades, covering the period 1760-1891. There is no 
reason to expect that the results will be the same at decadal level as over a longer time period. 
As we noted earlier, the literature finds that Gibrat's Law is more likely to be violated in 
shorter periods (Gonzáles-Val, 2010, Glaeser et al., 2011). This is because a shorter period is 
more likely to contain a single event that will cause a violation, and because of the absence of 
the smoothing effect of a longer time period. Against that, it is possible that a smaller but 
persistent effect, decade on decade, may not be significant in any one decade, but could be 
significant over a longer time period. 
Again for completeness we look at England as a whole, and (after 1801) at Industrial 
Revolution and non-Industrial Revolution counties separately. The results are summarised in 
table 2, with the full set of graphs given in the online appendix 2. Once more, the patterns are 
remarkably consistent, with all periods exhibiting a U shape to greater or lesser extent.  
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 establishes five facts. First, Gibrat’s Law is violated for a substantial proportion of 
the population in each decade, and for each set of counties under consideration. In well over 
half the rows of the table, a majority of the population lived in places of sizes that violated 
Gibrat's Law.  
Second, industrial and non-Industrial Revolution counties behave very differently. Violations 
in Industrial Revolution counties are much more likely to involve places growing too quickly, 
than too slowly. In contrast violations in non-Industrial Revolution places always consist of 
places growing too slowly. Furthermore, the range of sizes for which Gibrat's Law is violated 
because growth is too low is much larger for non-Industrial Revolution counties. Substantial 
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market towns, with 5-10,000 people found themselves left behind, particularly around the 
middle of the 19th century. 
Third, the proportion of people living in places that grew too slowly declines over time. This 
is true from 1841 onwards for Industrial Revolution counties, and from 1861 onwards for 
non-Industrial Revolution counties. It is not so much that the range of sizes that violate 
Gibrat’s Law changes, but rather the proportion of the population living in places in these 
sizes falls. At one level this is an arithmetic requirement: given that these places are growing 
more slowly than the population as a whole, it follows that in later decades they will contain a 
lower share of the total population. 
Fourth, the proportion of the population who live in Industrial Revolution counties in places 
of sizes that grow too quickly falls over time, but the pattern is somewhat more erratic. (We 
note parenthetically that the remarkably low figure for 1851-61 is anomalous. For this decade 
a significant proportion of the population grows at a rate that is almost, but not quite, too high 
to be in keeping with Gibrat's Law. We believe that little should be read into this particular 
figure.) 
Fifth, the picture for England as a whole is not a simple average of the two subsections. This 
is most obviously true when we look at places where growth is too rapid to be compatible 
with Gibrat's Law. These places are extensive in Industrial Revolution counties, but given 
that these are numerically less important than non-Industrial Revolution counties, their 
statistical power is largely lost when the two subsections are combined. 
These facts all add to our understanding of the Industrial Revolution. We have found that 
Gibrat’s Law generally does not hold when we look either at longer periods, or at individual 
decades. That is an important finding: the Industrial Revolution was revolutionary in many 
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ways, and one aspect of that revolution was to revolutionise not just the size of English towns 
and cities, but to violate a law on city growth that has been found to hold in many 
circumstances.  
Second, we have found that Gibrat's Law is violated for both Industrial Revolution and non-
Industrial Revolution counties, albeit in very different ways. Non-Industrial Revolution 
counties were largely bypassed, and their populations did not grow in line with the nation as a 
whole. For sure, the Industrial Revolution had an effect even in these places. Trade and 
commerce became more firmly embedded in English life, as per Napoleon’s jibe that England 
was “a nation of shopkeepers”. Agriculture changed, with a growing importance of fresh, 
city-bound crops, such as dairy and fruit (Hunt and Pam, 1997). Port and seaside towns grew, 
and changed dramatically in nature. Sussex was never a core part of the Industrial 
Revolution, but Brighton, its leading seaside resort, was very much a creation of the railway. 
But for all this, people were voting with their feet, and leaving all but the largest towns in 
these counties. 
Third, there is no discernible trend in the range of sizes for which Gibrat’s Law was violated. 
England remained a nation of change throughout the nineteenth century. Population 
continued to grow dramatically, and towns evolved in ways that were not easy to predict ex 
ante. Table 2 gives a sense that the system was less turbulent as the nineteenth century wore 
on, but the overall picture remains one of long run and ongoing change. 
Fourth, the proportion of people living in places for which Gibrat’s Law was violated falls 
over time. Population continued to grow, but as the country developed and became more 
modern, patterns of development stabilised. New and extensive coal deposits were 
increasingly rare, and the disruptive influences of new towns became less frequent. England 
was beginning to settle down. 
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Finally, the proportion of the population of Industrial Revolution counties living in places of 
sizes that violate Gibrat’s Law was lower than the equivalent in non-Industrial Revolution 
counties, particularly as the period wore on. This is perhaps the most surprising finding, and 
reminds us that the levels of outmigration from some areas were very high indeed. These 
places could not support the natural rate of population increase, and therefore migration was a 
requirement. 
Understanding these findings  
We have found that Gibrat's Law was violated in three distinct ways. First, small places 
(populations ~50-2,000) in England grew too slowly. Second, medium places (populations 
2,000-8,000) in non-Industrial Revolution counties grew too slowly. Third, large places (say, 
30,000 and up, but less tightly defined) in Industrial Revolution counties grew too quickly. 
Many of the models that set out conditions under which Gibrat's Law holds have implausibly 
restrictive assumptions. Eaton and Eckstein (1997), for example, require zero discounting, 
Gabaix (1999) requires independent and identically distributed amenity or productivity 
shocks and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) require either no physical or human capital. 
None of these models can help us understand England in this era.  
The models developed by Eeckhout (2004) and Córdoba (2008) are more useful. Both share a 
common trait: they model Gibrat’s Law as an equilibrium condition between positive and 
negative externalities. In Eeckhout’s (2004) model a city is characterized by a productivity 
parameter reflecting its technological position, which rises in the size of the city. On the other 
hand, city size also imposes a negative externality owing to the need for workers to commute. 
In this model, Gibrat’s Law holds when the positive productivity externalities balance the 
negative commuting externality. Córdoba’s 2008 model is similar. In this case city size raises 
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productivity because of informational spillovers, pecuniary externalities, and/or search and 
matching in local labour markets. Larger cities also create negative externalities, such as 
congestion costs, which reduce productivity. Again, Gibrat’s Law is satisfied when positive 
and negative externalities balance. 
These models can explain our violations of Gibrat’s Law if four conditions hold. First, city 
sizes can change in response to economic incentives. Second, larger cities must impose costs 
on residents. Third, larger cities must offer productivity benefits. Fourth, they must do so 
disproportionately in Industrial Revolution industries. We will look at each in turn.  
There are three reasons to believe that city sizes would have responded to incentives in this 
era, and one note of caution. First, as noted earlier, this was an era with almost no zoning or 
planning laws. Towns could expand in a manner predicted by market-based economic 
models. Second, there were no laws on migration or residency. People could and did migrate. 
Third, there was no tax wedge to blunt the working of the model. In a competitive market, a 
rise in workers’ marginal revenue product will raise (gross) wages, but workers care about 
net wages. In this era virtually no workers would have paid income tax, and there was no 
widespread sales tax either. Again this suggests that a market clearing model will offer useful 
intuitions. Against this, workers rented rather than owned housing. Rents were set by the 
market, and there was a strong rent gradient from the city centre. Commuting was expensive, 
so most people lived near their place of work. This means that as a city grew, the benefits of 
higher labour productivity would have been manifest in higher gross and net of tax wages, 
but the workers would lose some of the gain to landlords, in the form of higher rent 
payments. Taken together, these facts lead us to expect that town sizes would respond to 
economic incentives, but that city sizes may have remained below their optimal level. 
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It is straightforward to show that large towns imposed monetary and non-monetary costs on 
workers. Life expectancy was as low as 25 in Manchester, 16 years short of the national 
average, a damning indictment of urban squalor (Szreter and Mooney, 1988, p. 93, table 3). 
Engels described cities as “social murder” (Voth 2004, 284). De Toqueville, visiting 
Manchester for the first time, noted that the smoke and pollution blotted out the sun. This was 
aesthetically unpleasant, and limited vitamin D production. This, along with poor diet, let to 
rickets and other physical deformities (Hunt, 2005, p. 26). The problem was so extensive that 
factory commissioner Dr Bisset Hawkins reported that: “most travellers are struck by the 
lowness of stature, the leanness and paleness which present themselves so commonly to the 
eye in Manchester.” (Floud et al., 1990, p. 1). Williamson (1990) estimated urban disamenity 
premiums needed for potential migrants to consider moving to towns at three to seven per 
cent.  
Against that, we also have strong evidence that larger cities were more productive. At one 
level we can deduce this: cities grew, despite the urban penalty. Firms could only pay the 
higher wages required if productivity was higher in cities. There is an extensive literature on 
the role of agglomeration economies in modern manufacturing in this era, most obviously in 
the textile industry. Alfred Marshall (1919, 1920) first identified “external economies of 
scale”, noting that “The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the 
air”. Broadberry and Marrison (2002) find econometric evidence to support this proposition: 
wages rise in the number of people in an occupation in a city, but not with firm size. Porter 
(1998) argues that larger cities are better at facilitating “cluster economies”, whereby firms in 
related industries locate close together, raising the productivity of all. There is evidence for 
clustering in the textile industry. Worrall’s Textile Directory lists large numbers of machinery 
makers, belt makers, suppliers of grease and tallow and so on, as well as cotton 
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manufacturers. Together, these advantages allowed small textile firms to remain competitive 
despite much higher labour costs than those in rival nations (Clark 1987, Leunig, 2003). This 
allowed the industry to persist even after the arrival of lower wage competition (Broadberry, 
Marrison and Leunig, 2009). To quote de Toqueville again, “From this foul drain the greatest 
stream of human industry flows out to fertilise the whole world. From this filthy sewer pure 
gold flows.” (1958, 107-8). 
The productivity benefits of larger cities were very industry specific. Traditional, pre-
mechanised, manufacturing is characterised by very limited internal and external economies 
of scale. Workshops were small, and could be widely scattered. Customers were largely local. 
Industries such as food manufacture, pin and lock makers, furriers, hat manufacturers, shoe 
makers, brick makers, cabinet makers, bookbinders, piano makers, builders, shop workers, 
insurance agents, clergy, dentists, waiters, domestic servants, and general labourers were not 
characterised by either internal or external economies of scale to any extent (Crafts, 1985, 5; 
Lee, 1979, 30-37).  
Taken together, this conceptualisation of the costs and benefits of cities in different 
circumstances leads us to the following predictions. First, places specialising in traditional 
industries should not grow, since there is no gain to producers, and costs to workers. Second, 
that places with modern industries should grow much faster, as the benefits to producers will 
outweigh the costs to workers. These asymmetries will lead to substantial violations of 
Gibrat's Law.  
This is, of course, what we find. Small places everywhere grow slowly. These places do not, 
on the whole, have modern industry, even when they are located in an Industrial Revolution 
county. They did not grow because the costs would have exceeded the benefits of doing so. 
The same is true for medium sized places in non-Industrial Revolution towns. Again, these 
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were not characterised by modern manufacturing, but were instead market towns and similar. 
Places of this size in Industrial Revolution counties grew at a faster rate, one compatible with 
Gibrat's Law. This set of places consisted of both market towns in Industrial Revolution 
counties, and fast growing modern manufacturing centres. Larger places in Industrial 
Revolution counties grew fastest of all. This group of places did not include conventional 
market towns, and instead consisted exclusively of fast growing towns characterised by 
modern industry. Without the slower growing market towns in the mix, they therefore violate 
Gibrat's Law from above.  
Conclusion 
The Industrial Revolution was revolutionary enough to cause extensive violations of Gibrat's 
Law. Population as a whole grew dramatically, but unevenly. We have always known that 
growth was uneven by county, but this article shows that it was also uneven by initial size. 
The towns that grew from almost nowhere, places such as Swindon, Crewe, and 
Middlesbrough, were very much the exceptions. Small places rarely broke through, and were 
much more likely to be left behind. Larger places in Industrial Revolution counties, in 
contrast, grew rapidly often becoming industrial powerhouses. 
This exercise helps us in two ways. First, it is a useful example of how a market-based 
economy with few land controls and very low taxes responds to big structural changes. In 
these circumstances Gibrat's Law is broken in both the short and long runs. This was true for 
every decade 1761-1891, and for periods of 40 years or more. 
Second, it forces us to think about the nature of different towns in this era. The basis of the 
economy in a small town was different to that in a large town, and the basis of the economy 
was different in large towns according to whether they were in an industrialising area or not. 
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When agglomeration economies are asymmetric across industry and therefore place, the 
models of Eeckhout and Córdoba predict what we find: places grow in a manner predictable 
by their initial size and location, thus violating Gibrat's Law.  
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Table 1: Was Gibrat’s Law violated before or after the invention of the railway? 
  % population in places:   
 
Initial 
population 
violation: 
growth too 
low  
no violation 
violation: 
growth too 
high 
no estimate 
possible 
principal 
downward 
violations 
size range 
principal 
upward 
violations 
size range 
   
 Pre-railway 
All counties 8,632,940 47 34 3 16 20-1,900  
IR counties 1,811,079 26 23 51 0 20-900 >6,000 
non-IR 
counties 
4,438,710 78 22 0 0 20-4,000  
   
 
  
  
 
  
 Post-railway 
All counties 15,043,400 33 41 0 26 55-2,200  
IR counties 3,791,721 16 50 34 0 20-1,400 >70,000 
non-IR 
counties 
6,821,493 81 19 0 0 20-10,000  
 
0 includes some figures that are less than 0.01%; there are no results between 0.01% and 0.5% 
Population in industrial and non-industrial revolution counties do not add up to the total population because some counties are characterized as neither 
industrial nor non-industrial. 
  
Tables 1-2 for text
Table 2: Was Gibrat’s Law violated? Results for individual decades 
  % of population in places:   
Decade 
Initial 
population 
Violation: 
growth too low 
No violation 
Violation: 
growth too high 
no estimate 
possible 
principal 
downward violations size 
range 
principal upward violations size 
range 
All counties 
1761-71 6,310,340 48 37 5 10 4100-17000 <800, >75,000 
1771-81 6,623,366 41 46 2 11 3500-13600 >85,000 
1781-91 7,206,143 58 30 1 11 3100-24000 50,000-70,000, >180000 
1791-1801 7,845,676 26 60 0 15 7700-16000 None 
        1801-11 8,632,940 42 43 0 16 60-1500 None 
1811-21 9,817,885 50 32 3 15 75-2900 24,000-28,000 
1821-31 11,405,928 47 32 5 17 40-2900 29,000-43,000 
1831-41 13,198,112 42 36 5 17 55-2700 14,000-18,000 & 32,000-42,000 
1841-51 15,043,400 50 23 6 21 70-6700 36,000-60,000 
1851-61 16,948,659 40 35 3 22 70-4400 13,000-15,000 
1861-71 18,654,135 29 41 7 23 50-2800 6,400-7,400, 20,000-22,000 
1871-81 21,153,566 29 47 0 24 40-4000 None 
1881-91 24,254,285 24 63 3 10 40-3300 15,600-18,000 
 
Industrial Revolution counties 
1801-11 1,811,079 18 20 62 0 60-600 >1300 
1811-21 2,143,555 27 32 40 0 75-1300 
3,600-8,000 & 16,000-40,000 & 
>70,000 
1821-31 2,584,172 28 37 36 0 40-1700 >23,000 
1831-41 3,176,562 32 29 39 0 15-3200 >34,000 
1841-51 3,791,721 27 39 35 0 40-5200 31,000-100,000 & >230,000 
1851-61 4,422,153 19 77 4 0 45-2300 38,000-60,000 
1861-71 5,021,691 15 61 24 0 50-2000  5,300-15000, 200,000-400,000 
1871-81 5,855,245 10 45 45 0 25-1500 3,800-80,000, 200,000-300,000 
1881-91 7,048,067 10 63 27 0 30-2000 6,400-70,000 
 
Non-Industrial Revolution counties 
1801-11 4,438,710 77 23 0 0 50-3700 none 
1811-21 4,915,111 78 22 0 0 50-5000 none 
1821-31 5,603,537 82 18 0 0 30-6800 none 
1831-41 6,242,233 76 24 0 0 40-6500 none 
1841-51 6,821,493 78 22 0 0 60-8200 none 
1851-61 7,291,218 80 20 0 0 60-12000 none 
1861-71 7,503,443 70 30 0 0 30-8200 none 
1871-81 8,088,941 67 33 0 0 40-8400 none 
1881-91 8,597,210 57 43 0 0 30-6500 none 
 
Figure 1 1760-1801 
 
Notes to figure 1: Central estimate and 99% confidence intervals. 
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Figures 1-4 (all figures for main text)
Figure 2 1801-1891 
 
Notes to figure 2: As figure 1 
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Figure 3: Industrial Revolution counties, 1801-91 
 
Notes to figure 3: As figure 1 
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Figure 4: Non Industrial Revolution counties, 1801-1891 
 
Notes to figure 4: As figure 1 
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Appendix 1: the distribution of growth rates  
 
Figure A1a: Distribution of annual average growth rates, 1761-1801 
 
Notes: “-3.0%” means -3.0%=<x<2.5%, etc. 
 
Figure A1b: Distribution of annual average growth rates, 1801-1891 
 
Notes: as per figure A1a 
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Appendix 2: Growth rates by size of place 
Notes  
This appendix shows the central estimates and 99% confidence intervals.  
The x-axis includes places of all sizes. The right hand section is often missing because there are so 
few large places. Where the largest place is of a unique size there is no reliable way to produce an 
estimate or confidence intervals. The largest place in non-industrial revolution counties is often of 
similar size to other places and therefore we are able to provide estimates and confidence intervals.  
For consistency and visual clarity, the y-axis (standardised growth rates) range from -3 to +3 in each 
case.  
Graphs are given as follows: 
i) 1761-1801, England 
ii) 1761-1771, England 
iii) 1771-1781, England 
iv) 1781-1791, England 
v) 1791-1801, England 
vi) 1801-1891, England 
vii) 1801-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
viii) 1801-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
ix) 1801-1841, England 
x) 1801-1841, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xi) 1801-1841, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xii) 1841-1891, England 
xiii) 1841-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xiv) 1841-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xv) 1801-1811, England 
xvi) 1801-1811, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xvii) 1801-1811, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xviii) 1811-1821, England 
xix) 1811-1821, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xx) 1811-1821, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxi) 1821-1831, England 
xxii) 1821-1831, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xxiii) 1821-1831, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxiv) 1831-1841, England 
xxv) 1831-1841, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xxvi) 1831-1841, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxvii) 1841-1851, England 
xxviii) 1841-1851, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xxix) 1841-1851, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxx) 1851-1861, England 
xxxi) 1851-1861, England: industrial revolution counties only 
Appendix 2: online only
Click here to download Supplementary Material: Appendix 2.docx
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xxxii) 1851-1861, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxxiii) 1861-1871, England 
xxxiv) 1861-1871, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xxxv) 1861-1871, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxxvi) 1871-1881, England 
xxxvii) 1871-1881, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xxxviii) 1871-1881, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
xxxix) 1881-1891, England 
xl) 1881-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
xli) 1881-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
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i) 1761-1801, England 
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ii) 1761-1771, England 
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iii) 1771-1781, England 
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iv) 1781-1791, England 
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v) 1791-1801, England 
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vi) 1801-1891, England 
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vii) 1801-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 9 21 49 114 264 612 1414 3270 7562 17486 40435 93502 
10 
 
viii) 1801-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 8 16 31 61 121 240 475 939 1858 3677 7275 14393 28478 56344 
11 
 
ix) 1801-1841, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 14 50 176 619 2184 7704 27173 95847 338077 
12 
 
x) 1801-1841, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 9 21 49 114 264 612 1414 3270 7562 17486 40435 93502 
13 
 
xi) 1801-1841, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 8 16 31 61 121 240 475 939 1858 3677 7275 14393 28478 56344 
14 
 
xii) 1841-1891, England 
 
  
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
size 7 29 116 469 1899 7693 31170 126294 511707 
15 
 
xiii) 1841-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 8 20 52 133 343 885 2284 5892 15202 39222 101199 261107 
16 
 
xiv) 1841-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 5 12 29 69 169 410 994 2414 5861 14230 34547 83875 
17 
 
xv) 1801-1811, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 14 50 176 619 2184 7704 27173 95847 338077 
18 
 
xvi) 1801-1811, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 9 21 49 114 264 612 1414 3270 7562 17486 40435 93502 
19 
 
xvii) 1801-1811, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 8 16 31 61 121 240 475 939 1858 3677 7275 14393 28478 56344 
20 
 
xviii) 1811-1821, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 8 30 114 439 1690 6506 25044 96404 371089 
21 
 
xix) 1811-1821, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 5 12 31 76 189 469 1164 2891 7180 17830 44274 109942 
22 
 
xx) 1811-1821, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
5 10 19 38 76 149 294 581 1146 2260 4458 8793 17343 34209 67477 
23 
 
xxi) 1821-1831, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 11 42 159 600 2254 8477 31872 119838 450589 
24 
 
xxii) 1821-1831, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
7 16 37 85 194 446 1024 2352 5398 12392 28448 65306 149915 
25 
 
xxiii) 1821-1831, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 8 16 33 67 135 273 553 1117 2259 4567 9235 18672 37754 76334 
26 
 
xxiv) 1831-1841, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 8 32 127 506 2017 8045 32081 127937 510201 
27 
 
xxv) 1831-1841, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
7 17 39 92 217 513 1210 2857 6743 15917 37569 88676 209305 
28 
 
xxvi) 1831-1841, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 4 9 20 43 92 197 423 909 1954 4200 9024 19393 41673 89551 
29 
 
xxvii) 1841-1851, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 8 33 133 539 2184 8848 35851 145260 588553 
30 
 
xxviii) 1841-1851, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 8 20 52 133 343 885 2284 5892 15202 39222 101199 261107 
31 
 
xxix) 1841-1851, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
2 5 12 29 69 169 410 994 2414 5861 14230 34547 83875 
32 
 
xxx) 1851-1861, England 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 12 47 187 741 2937 11642 46151 182950 725242 
33 
 
xxxi) 1851-1861, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
5 13 32 81 204 515 1303 3292 8319 21024 53130 134271 339327 
34 
 
xxxii) 1851-1861, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 7 17 40 94 223 528 1249 2957 7001 16571 39227 92856 
35 
 
xxxiii) 1861-1871, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 12 49 196 792 3191 12860 51832 208905 841980 
36 
 
xxxiv) 1861-1871, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 10 27 71 184 481 1252 3263 8504 22160 57745 150475 392111 
37 
 
xxxv) 1861-1871, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
6 14 31 69 155 350 790 1782 4019 9065 20447 46119 104022 
38 
 
xxxvi) 1871-1881, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 12 50 207 848 3475 14248 58415 239494 981896 
39 
 
xxxvii) 1871-1881, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
6 15 39 100 254 648 1653 4216 10755 27435 69981 178510 455351 
40 
 
xxxviii) 1871-1881, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 7 17 42 102 246 595 1437 3471 8383 20245 48893 118078 
41 
 
xxxix) 1881-1891, England 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 16 66 268 1089 4426 17981 73046 296748 1205530 
42 
 
xl) 1881-1891, England: industrial revolution counties only 
 
  
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
7 18 46 117 300 769 1967 5034 12882 32969 84375 215936 552633 
43 
 
xli) 1881-1891, England: non- industrial revolution counties only 
 
 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 10 23 54 129 309 736 1755 4186 9982 23806 56774 135397 
 ********************************All 
places******************************************* 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L  , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1801) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1891_1801 smoothvalues_1891_1801) se(se_1891_1801)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L  , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841_1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841_1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1841_1801) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1841_1801 smoothvalues_1841_1801) se(se_1841_1801)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L  , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1841) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1891_1841 smoothvalues_1891_1841) se(se_1891_1841)  
Stata code
Click here to download Supplementary Material: Stata_Code_Gibrats_Law.docx
  
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L  , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1801) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1811_1801 smoothvalues_1811_1801) se(se_1811_1801)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L  , d 
gen sadj1811 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1811 = 1.06 * sadj1811 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1811 
drop sadj1811 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L ln_persons_1811_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1811) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1821_1811 smoothvalues_1821_1811) se(se_1821_1811)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L  , d 
gen sadj1821 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1821 = 1.06 * sadj1821 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1821 
drop sadj1821 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L ln_persons_1821_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1821) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1831_1821 smoothvalues_1831_1821) se(se_1831_1821)  
 
 quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L  , d 
gen sadj1831 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1831 = 1.06 * sadj1831 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1831 
drop sadj1831 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L ln_persons_1831_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1831) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1841_1831 smoothvalues_1841_1831) se(se_1841_1831)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L  , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1841) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1851_1841 smoothvalues_1851_1841) se(se_1851_1841)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L  , d 
gen sadj1851 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1851 = 1.06 * sadj1851 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1851 
drop sadj1851 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L ln_persons_1851_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1851) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1861_1851 smoothvalues_1861_1851) se(se_1861_1851)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L  , d 
gen sadj1861 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1861 = 1.06 * sadj1861 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1861 
drop sadj1861 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L ln_persons_1861_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1861) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1871_1861 smoothvalues_1871_1861) se(se_1871_1861)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L  , d 
gen sadj1871 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1871 = 1.06 * sadj1871 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1871 
drop sadj1871 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L ln_persons_1871_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1871) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1881_1871 smoothvalues_1881_1871) se(se_1881_1871)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L  , d 
gen sadj1881 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1881 = 1.06 * sadj1881 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1881 
drop sadj1881 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L ln_persons_1881_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1881) nograph ci 
level(99) generate(grid_1891_1881 smoothvalues_1891_1881) se(se_1891_1881)  
 
 
 
********************************IR places******************************************* 
 
 quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1801IR = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1801IR 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1801IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1891_1801IR smoothvalues_1891_1801IR) se(se_1891_1801IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841_1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841_1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1841_1801IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1841_1801IR smoothvalues_1841_1801IR) se(se_1841_1801IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1841IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1891_1841IR smoothvalues_1891_1841IR) se(se_1891_1841IR)  
 
  
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1801IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1811_1801IR smoothvalues_1811_1801IR) se(se_1811_1801IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1811>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1811 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1811 = 1.06 * sadj1811 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1811 
drop sadj1811 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L ln_persons_1811_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1811>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1811IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1821_1811IR smoothvalues_1821_1811IR) se(se_1821_1811IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1821>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1821 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1821 = 1.06 * sadj1821 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1821 
drop sadj1821 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L ln_persons_1821_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1821>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1821IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1831_1821IR smoothvalues_1831_1821IR) se(se_1831_1821IR)  
  
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1831>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1831 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1831 = 1.06 * sadj1831 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1831 
drop sadj1831 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L ln_persons_1831_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1831>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1831IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1841_1831IR smoothvalues_1841_1831IR) se(se_1841_1831IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1841IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1851_1841IR smoothvalues_1851_1841IR) se(se_1851_1841IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1851>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1851 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1851 = 1.06 * sadj1851 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1851 
drop sadj1851 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L ln_persons_1851_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1851>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1851IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1861_1851IR smoothvalues_1861_1851IR) se(se_1861_1851IR)  
  
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1861>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1861 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1861 = 1.06 * sadj1861 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1861 
drop sadj1861 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L ln_persons_1861_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1861>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1861IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1871_1861IR smoothvalues_1871_1861IR) se(se_1871_1861IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1871>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1871 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1871 = 1.06 * sadj1871 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1871 
drop sadj1871 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L ln_persons_1871_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1871>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1871IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1881_1871IR smoothvalues_1881_1871IR) se(se_1881_1871IR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1881>=29.6 , d 
gen sadj1881 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1881 = 1.06 * sadj1881 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1881 
drop sadj1881 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L ln_persons_1881_L if 
RevolutIndustry_Percent_1881>=29.6, n(100) bwidth ($bw1881IR) nograph ci level(99) 
generate(grid_1891_1881IR smoothvalues_1891_1881IR) se(se_1891_1881IR)  
  
 
 
********************************NIR 
places******************************************* 
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1801NIR = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1801NIR 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1801NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1891_1801NIR 
smoothvalues_1891_1801NIR) se(se_1891_1801NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841_1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841_1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1841_1801NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1841_1801NIR 
smoothvalues_1841_1801NIR) se(se_1841_1801NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841<14 , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1891_1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1891_1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1891_1841NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1891_1841NIR 
smoothvalues_1891_1841NIR) se(se_1891_1841NIR)  
 
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14 , d 
gen sadj1801 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1801 = 1.06 * sadj1801 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1801 
drop sadj1801 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1811_1801_L ln_persons_1801_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1801<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1801NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1811_1801NIR 
smoothvalues_1811_1801NIR) se(se_1811_1801NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1811<14 , d 
gen sadj1811 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1811 = 1.06 * sadj1811 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1811 
drop sadj1811 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1821_1811_L ln_persons_1811_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1811<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1811NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1821_1811NIR 
smoothvalues_1821_1811NIR) se(se_1821_1811NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1821<14 , d 
gen sadj1821 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1821 = 1.06 * sadj1821 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1821 
drop sadj1821 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1831_1821_L ln_persons_1821_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1821<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1821NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1831_1821NIR 
smoothvalues_1831_1821NIR) se(se_1831_1821NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1831<14 , d 
gen sadj1831 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1831 = 1.06 * sadj1831 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1831 
drop sadj1831 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1841_1831_L ln_persons_1831_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1831<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1831NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1841_1831NIR 
smoothvalues_1841_1831NIR) se(se_1841_1831NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841<14 , d 
gen sadj1841 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1841 = 1.06 * sadj1841 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1841 
drop sadj1841 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1851_1841_L ln_persons_1841_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1841<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1841NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1851_1841NIR 
smoothvalues_1851_1841NIR) se(se_1851_1841NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1851<14 , d 
gen sadj1851 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1851 = 1.06 * sadj1851 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1851 
drop sadj1851 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1861_1851_L ln_persons_1851_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1851<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1851NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1861_1851NIR 
smoothvalues_1861_1851NIR) se(se_1861_1851NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1861<14 , d 
gen sadj1861 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1861 = 1.06 * sadj1861 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1861 
drop sadj1861 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1871_1861_L ln_persons_1861_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1861<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1861NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1871_1861NIR 
smoothvalues_1871_1861NIR) se(se_1871_1861NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1871<14 , d 
gen sadj1871 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1871 = 1.06 * sadj1871 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1871 
drop sadj1871 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1881_1871_L ln_persons_1871_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1871<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1871NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1881_1871NIR 
smoothvalues_1881_1871NIR) se(se_1881_1871NIR)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1881<14 , d 
gen sadj1881 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1881 = 1.06 * sadj1881 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1881 
drop sadj1881 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1891_1881_L ln_persons_1881_L if RevolutIndustry_Percent_1881<14, 
n(100) bwidth ($bw1881NIR) nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1891_1881NIR 
smoothvalues_1891_1881NIR) se(se_1891_1881NIR)  
 
 
 
 quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1771_1761_L  , d 
gen sadj1761 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1771_1761 = 1.06 * sadj1761 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1771_1761 
drop sadj1761 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1771_1761_L ln_persons_1761_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1771_1761) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1771_1761 smoothvalues_1771_1761) se(se_1771_1761)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1781_1771_L  , d 
gen sadj1771 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1781_1771 = 1.06 * sadj1771 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1781_1771 
drop sadj1771 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1781_1771_L ln_persons_1771_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1781_1771) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1781_1771 smoothvalues_1781_1771) se(se_1781_1771)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1791_1781_L  , d 
gen sadj1781 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1791_1781 = 1.06 * sadj1781 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1791_1781 
drop sadj1781 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1791_1781_L ln_persons_1781_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1791_1781) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1791_1781 smoothvalues_1791_1781) se(se_1791_1781)  
 
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1801_1791_L  , d 
gen sadj1791 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1801_1791 = 1.06 * sadj1791 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1801_1791 
drop sadj1791 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1801_1791_L ln_persons_1791_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1801_1791) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1801_1791 smoothvalues_1801_1791) se(se_1801_1791)  
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1801_1761_L  , d 
gen sadj1761 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1801_1761 = 1.06 * sadj1761 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1801_1761 
drop sadj1761 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1801_1761_L ln_persons_1761_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1801_1761) 
nograph ci level(99) generate(grid_1801_1761 smoothvalues_1801_1761) se(se_1801_1761)  
 
 
 
 
quietly su wstandard_pers_ratio_1771_1761_L  , d 
gen sadj1761 = min(r(sd), ((r(p75)-r(p25))/1.349)) 
global bw1771_1761 = 1.06 * sadj1761 / (r(N)^0.2) 
display $bw1771_1761 
drop sadj1761 
lpoly wstandard_pers_ratio_1771_1761_L ln_persons_1761_L, n(100) bwidth ($bw1771_1761) 
nograph ci level(95) generate(grid_1771_1761vs2 smoothvalues_1771_1761vs2) 
se(se_1771_1761vs2) 
  
*Population data by place. (Not zipped, small file)
Click here to download Replication Data (.ZIP): raw data.xlsx
